INTRODUCTION
Dispute settlen1ent mechanisms are conceived to ensure the respect of negotiated rules. In an organization such as the World Trade Organization (WTo), wherc ail countries are equal and subject to the same rights and obligations, a dispute settlement mechanism_ ncccssarily requires impartial interpretation of the applicable rules and a fair and independent administration of the dispute settlement procedures. The impartiality and independence of the pers ons involvcd in the new dispute seulement mechanism of the WTo have acquired even grea ter importance as the conclusions of panels and the Appellate Body are now binding. Indeed, Members, having forgone their right to black the adoption of a panel/ Appellatc Body report, must do their utmost to guarantee the highest quality of the new mechanism in arder to ensure confidence therein. There were no doubts among the considerations which, bcfore the entry into force of the WTo, led the United States to propose the adoption of a set ofRules ofEthical Conduct for Dispute Settlement.
Although ali countries favoured the highest level of ethics from ali thosc involved in the WTo dispute settlement mechanism and the most rigorous impartiality of the dispute settlement system itself, the negotiations of this set of "Rules ofEthics" proved to be very sensitive and difficult. Rules on the "ethical conduct" of pers ons involved in the dispute settlement mechanisn1 involve an assessment of the behaviour of people with different cultures, with very different traditions, and therefore with a different appreciation of concepts such as appearance of bias, direct and indirect conflict of interest, impartiality or independence. These sensitive negotiations were chaired by Ambassador Armstrong from New Zealand. After numerous working sessions over a period of tvvo years, the Metnbers of the WTo, acting as the Dispute Settlement Body fOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (DsB), adopted the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures for the Settletnent of Disputes (Dsu) on 3 Decetnber 1996.1
The WTO Rules of Conduct, design cd to main tain the integrity, impartiality and confldentiality of proceedings conducted under the Dsu, are the n1ost claborate and sophisticatcd of such rules applicable to participants in any international dispute scttlcment process. This article attcmpts to relate sorne aspects of their ncgotiation, describe their functioning and suggest analytical interpretations of sorne of their provisions. However, the negotiation of thcse Rules of Conclu ct also deserves attention because they constitutc a good example of (1) the power and sensitivity of the "consensus" decision-making process 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTo which resulted in a balanced and well-considered framework of rights and obligations, and (2) the strong determination of WTo Mcmbers to maintain an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism for thcir trade disputes. Both of these characteristics of the GATT and now the WTo systems were, inde cd, apparent in the approach of the negotiators.
This article first looks at the historical background of th esc negotiations indu ding the need, under the old regime of the GATT dispute settlement, for more precise ndes on conf1dentiality and other aspects of the ünpartiality of its adjudicators. Sorne of the past lacunae were corrected with the new provisions of the Dsu. However, these provisions were apparcntly considered insufficient by the United States (at least as far as thcir enforce1nent was concerned), who proposed during the last 1nonths of the Preparatmy Committee for the entry into force of the WTO, the adoption of what was then called a "Code of Ethics". Taking into consideration ex:isting sets of similar rules applicable in other fora and the specifie characteristic and necd of the WTo dispute settlement mcchanism, Ambassador Armstrong was to lead this informai working group through most difficult negotiations to the adoption of a balanced set of provisions intendcd to ensure and enhance confidence in the new dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO.
The second part of this article is concerned with sorne specifie negotiating strategies which revcal the highly sensitive charactcr of these Rules of Conduct; which were initially seen by smne participants as a potential threat to the efficiency of the new binding and automatic rules of the Dsu. The varions interests involved in this pro cess and the evolution of the Members' positions should shed light on the parameters of the obligations containcd in this new legal instrument of the WTo.
Finally, the third part of this article focuses on the main provi"ions and the main issues of the Ru! es of Conduct, presente cl chronologically as they surfaced dnring the negotiations. The reader should thcn undcrstand the overall functioning of these new 1 The text of the Rules of Conduct fOr the Dsu is included at the end of this artide, and can be found in document WT/DsH/RC/1 which was adopted by the Dsn on 3 Decernber 19%, WT/Dsn/M/27. 2 In particular ail decisions of the Ds11 must be takcn by consensus, art. 2.4 of the Dsu vvhich is deftned in footnote 1 to Article 2.4 as "The Dsn shall be deemed to have dccided by consensus on a matter submitted for its comideration, if no Member, pre5ent at the meeting of the Dsl3 whcn a decision i> taken, formally abjects to the proposed decision."
Rules of Conduct and their dcvelopment, and better grasp the scope of the solutions negotiated ta address the difficulties arising fi_·om different understandings of what constitutes a conftict of intcrest or independence and ünpartiality. !1. BACKGROUND A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The J\Teedfor Rules on Coi!fidentiality and Other Ru les cif "Ethics))
A few times during the GATT years, the issue of the confidentiality and impartiality of the dispute settlement process and its adjudicators was raised. For instance, even following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, at the GATT Council's meeting of21 June 1994 Canada raised the issues of confidentiality of proceedings, the conduct of panclists and the impartiality of the panel pro cess, and questioned the adequacy of the existing procedures.3 To avoid undennining the panel process, it proposed the adoption of a Code of Conduct for panelists '\vhich could be do ne with a view to clarifying, or codifying, GATT practicc without reopcning the text of the Dsu". This proposition was strongly supported by the European Conm1mllties and Norway. For the United States, the new dispute settlement mechanisn1 and its integrity became, during 1994, a matter of Congressional intcrest during consideration ofWTo membership.
The US Proposa!
On 9 November 1994, the United States circulated to the participants in the SubCommittee on Institutional, Procedural and Legal Matters (IPL) of the Preparatory Committee for the WTo the text of a proposed "Code of Ethics for the Scttlement of Disputes" ,4 which would be applicable to all persans involved in the dispute scttlement processes of the WTo. The representative of the United States discussed the need to ensure "the integrity of proceedings conducted undcr the Dispute Settlement Understanding .... The ethical code was designed to complement the operation of the Dsu." 5 On 18 November 1994, Arnbassador Armstrong was formally asked ta chair informai consultations with a view ta reaching consensus on a final draft. Ali interested delegations were invited to participate. Although the US proposai was supported in principle by several delegations, this was the beginning of a negotiation which was to last more than two years. The first open-ended informai consultations took place on 23 November 1994 and an initial rcvised text was circulated in carly Decembcr.
.1 See C/M/273, at point 9, p. 13 of the Minutes. 4 Sec Document PC/lPL/W/12. s PJra. 20-26 ofPC/IrliM/R.
After severa! sessions of informai consultations, it became clear that the negociation of a tcxt could not possibly be completed bcfore the entry into force of the WTo on 1 January 1995. At the first WTO General Council Meeting on 31 January 1995, the Chairman K. Kesavapany, Ambassador for Singapore, proposed that the General Council adopt the report of the Preparatory Con1mittee as a whole, "on the understanding tlut the adoption of the report would mean that ' ... the establishment of the Appcllate Body and the Rules ofEthics were referred to the Dispute Settlcment Body'". 6 At the first meeting of the Dsn on 10 February 1995, the Chairman recalled that the Prcparatory Corrunittee bad forwarded the work clone on draft Rules of Conduct to the WTO as a possible basis for further work. "The Chairman then proposed that the DsB invite Ambassador Armstrong to pursue informai consultations with the view of concluding a final draft Code of Conduct for consideration by the Dse before 24 March 1995." 7 This was agrced by the DsB8 lt should be remembered that at the same time,WTo Members wcre in the process of selecting the members of the Appcllate Body and it was informally understood that these Rules of Ethical Con du ct would be applicable to them. Therefore, it was urgent that the Rules of Conduct be fmalized so that they could bind the members of the Appellate Body. As it happened, the negotiation of the Rules of Conduct would not, however, be completed until 3 December 1996 (although they were incorporated by the Appellate Body into its Working Procedures at an earlier date, subject to their final revision).9
During almost tvvo years, the open-endcd informai group ofWTO Members met on numerous occasions and the active participation of many delegations led to a final draft text of the Rules of Conduct which arguably improved the initial US proposai, taking into account the concerns of many Members in a common effort to strengthen the rules of, and confidence in, the Wro dispute settlement system.
(a) The content of the initial US proposai
The content of the initial US draft Rules ofEthical Conduct for the Dsu was quite different from the eventual set of Rules of Conduct. Although the general structure of ' presentation appears similar, important substantive changes to rights, obligations and presumptions and much greater procedural precision were introduccd by the negotiations. The proposai contained sevcn sections. The preamble affirmed the importance of the integrity and impartiality of the Dsu proceedings to increase confidence in the dispute scttlement system. welcomed "the stronger and clearer legal framework they have adopted for the conduct of international trade, including a nwre effective and reliable dispute settlement mechanism". The document stated that in orcier to achieve a "relia ble" dispute settlement mechanistn, it was esscntial that the integrity and impartiality of proceedings conducted undcr the Dsu be nuintained. It also rcferrcd to the avoidance of conflicts of interest mentioned in Article 17.3 of the Dsu in relation ta the Appcllate Body and the impartiality of the WTo Secretariat specifically addressed in Article 27.2 of the Dsu (in relation to the manner in which legal advice and assistance are provided by the Secretariat to developing country Members). The document further stated that "in addition to these specifie provisions, the operation of the Dsu should be furthcr strcngthened by Rules of Ethical Conduct adopted by the appropriate WTü body that would apply gencrally for the settlement of disputes". The intention of this US proposai was for:
"these rules to ensure that each persan servîng on a panel or the Appellate Body, as weil as Secretariat officiais serving such persons, avoîd împropriety and the appearance of impropriety and observe high standards of conduct so that the întegrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement pro cess is preserved." This reference to "impropriety and the appcarancc of itnpropriety" was to be a source of controversy and the abject of long negotiations.
The document concluded by referring to what were considered to be the three main purposes of this Code ofEthical Conduct, which are repeated in Section II entitled "General Princip les": "(1) The rules are designed to ensure strict adherence to the rules and procedures that were negotiated in the Uruguay Round and codified in the Dsu. They would in no way modify the basic rights and obligations of Mcmbers with respect to dispute settlement under the WTO.
(2) The rules provide for disclosure to the WTO Members involved in a dispute by panelists, the Appdlate Body or Secretariat officiais of pertinent information bifore dispute settlement proceedings are underway so that potential confhcts of interest can be avoided. Draft disclosure statements to be used for this purpose have been attached.
(3) Panelists, Appcllate Body members and Secretariat off1cials would be required to take care in the performance of their duties during dispute settlcment proccedings to adhere to the rules of ethical conduct in order to maintain their independence and avoid creation of potential confticts of interest. The WTO Members would provide (by means of a separate decision, a draft of which is attache cl) 10 for the disqualification of any panelist, Appellate Body n1.ember or Secretariat official commîtting a material violation of the rules."
(b) Comments on the initial US proposalfor a Code of Ethical Condnct
Three important aspects of this initial US proposai wcre to be modified by the negotiations.
First, in the US proposai, "appearance of impropriety" as weil as "apprehension of bias" would have constituted a violation of the Rules ofEthical Conduct, would have had to have been disclosed and would have be en sufficicnt to justif)r the disqualification of anyone covered by the Rules of Ethical Conduct. This issue of the "appearance" became a cornerstone of the negotiations as it was most relevant at ail stages of the process: at the initial stage when persans were requested to disclose their situation, during the dispute process as there was an on-going obligation to maintain the standards of the Rules of Conduct, as a condition for initiating a disqualification challenge process and as a criterion for the disqualification of a covcred person. ln the final Rules of Conduct, appearance of impropriety is not mentioned in the text and violation of the Rules of Conduct may lead to disqualification only if it also affects the impartiality and integrity of the dispute settlen1ent mechanism. The question of perception (or "appearance") still exists in relation to the tenn "give rise to justifiable doubt as to" (Section III) which relates to self-disclosure and general behaviour.
Second, in the US draft, upon a party's allegation of a violation of the Rules of Ethical Conduct, a covercd person was to be disqualified unless the Director-General was to decide that there had been no violation. ln addition, if parties agreed, they had full authority to disqualifY any covered person. After two years of negotiation, the disqualification challenge procedure was further institutionalized, ali pers ons concerned were guaranteed the right to be heard, criteria for the initiation of a challenge and th ose for disqualification were tightened, while the timc allowed for the entire challenge process was limited to 15 days.
Third, ali persans involved in the dispute settlement process would have been subject to exactly the same obligations and the same procedures. The final text of the Rules of Conduct envisages four types of persans subject to the Rules of Conduct but in different ways: members of the Appcllate Body and thcir staff; panelists, experts and arbitrators; members of the Textiles Monitoring Body (Trvoe); and the members of the Secretariat involved in the specifie dispute settlement process. Although ali such pers ons are covercd by the same governing principles against conflicts of interest, and requirements of impartiality, independence and confidentiality, they do not have to disclose the same matters to the same authorities and, if challenged, arc subject to different procedures.
B. EXISTING IOELEVANT PROVISIONS
Before discussing the evolution of the negotiations, it should be remembered that the Dsu containcd certain provisions on the qualities and requiren1ents expccted from panelists, members of the Appellate Body, Secretariat staff and others involved in the RULES ON ETH!CS FOR THE NEW WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHAN!SM 63 dispute settlement process of the WTo. Other international agreements also contained similar rules which were helpful in trying to identify the best way to describe certain actions or behaviour considered unacceptable or thrcatening to the integrity of the dispute settlement mechanism.
The Obligations Existing in the Dsu
The WTo Agreement contains relevant provisions dealing with the obligations of panelists, mcmbcrs of the Appellate Body and staff mc1nbers of the WTo Secretariat.
(a) Panelists According to Article 8.2 of the Dsu, panelists 11 must be independent and serve in their individual capacity and, in this context, Men1bers shall not give panelists instructions nor seek to influence them (Article 8.9 of the Dsu). Individuals cannot act as panclists if they arc citizens of parties or third parties, absent agreement of the parties (Article 8.3 of the Dsu). Panelists cannot have ex-parte conununications (Article 18.1 of the Dsu) and cannot make public statements on the case (Article 18.2). Moreover, submissions and deliberations are confldcntial (Article 18.2) and decisions arc anonymous (Article 14.3). Finally, it is also stated in Article 11 of the Dsu that panels should make an objective asscssmcnt of the facts and the law, which implies the objectivity of the panelists.
(b) Members of the Appellate Body
Article 17.3 of the Dsu provides that membcrs of the Appellate Body 12 shall not be affiliated with any govcrmncnt or participate in the consideration of any dispute that would crea te direct or indirect conflict of interest. Article 17.10 pro vides that the procccdings of the Appellate Body are confidential. The provisions of Article 18 on the conftdentiality of written subnüssions and the prohibition of ex-parte communications are also applicable to the mcmbers of the Appellate Body. Opinions expressed by Appcllate Body members are to be anonymous (Article 17.11 of the Dsu).
11 According to art. 8.1 of the D'-U, panelists nmst be "well-qualificd governmental and/ or non-govermnental indivîduals" (induding those who have served on or prescnted a case to a panel, Member's delegates and those of GATT 1947 , a representative to a council or committec, a Secretariat officer, those that have taught or published on international trade law or policy, or a senior tradc policy official of a member) and of diverse background with wide spectrum of experience (art. 8.2 of the Dsu).
12 See art. 17.3, which also provides that they shall be recognized authorities, with demonstrated expertise în law, international trade and the subject-matter of the covcrcd agreements generally, that they shall be availablc at ali times and on short notice and that they shall stay abreast of dispute settlement activities and other relevant activities of the WTü. In discharge of their duties, they shall not seek to accept instructions from_ any government or other authority cxternal to the Wro. They shall refrain from any action which might adversely rcflect on their position as international officiais. As with panelists, it is envisaged that Men1bers shall respect the international charactcr of the responsibilities of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their dutics. Finally, Article 27.2 of the Dsu refcrs explicitly to the "continued in1partiality of the Secretariat" wh en it states that a WTo legal expert "shall assist developing country Members in a manner ensuring the continued impartiality of the Secretariat".
Therefore, one could argue that the WTo Agreement and the Dsu themselves in1posed on panelists, membcrs of the Appellate Body and staff members of the WTO, the obligation to the independent and impartial, to respect the confidentiality of dispute settlement proceedings and to a void confticts of interest. This aspect becmnes relevant wh en considering wh ether the Rules ofConduct constitutcd an amendment to the Dsu for the adoption of which Members would, arguably, have to follow special voting requirements. However, it was the view of ail Members participating in the open-ended working group that the Ru! es of Conclu ct could not modifY the rights and obligations of Members, negotiated in the Uruguay Round texts. Indeed, one may read into the first stated purpose of the Rules of Ethical Conduct proposcd by the United States: "The rules are designed to ensure strict adherence to the rules and procedures th at were negotiated in the Uruguay Round and codified in the Dsu .... "
It should also be noted tlnt other sets of similar rules dealing with the independence and impartiality and conflicts of intcrests of adjudicators cxist in other international fora.t3
Ill. THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY
The negotiation of the text, with hindsight, involved three broad phases. The first from November 1994 to April1995, was a pro cess of working through text, with initial comments on the US proposai, providing a basis to move quite quickly towards Dccetnber 1995 to an initial Chairman's draft, with key areas of differences being identified and explored. The second phase broadly ran from the presentation to the Chairman by Brazil on behalf of the group of Latin American countries (Grulac) of language, drawn on a revised chairman's text, which some delegations initially saw as an attempt to stall the negotiation, but which in fact was hclpful to the Chairman as it provided crucial and constructive impetus to the negotiations. It cleverly unlocked the gate to a solution, by identifying the final structure of the Draft Rules of Conduct and the need for different provisions to apply to the different participants in the system. In large measure, the negotiation was concluded by October 1995, the outstanding issue at that time concerning the application of the rules of conduct to the TMB, an issue which was to take approximately one year to resolve.
During the process of these negotiations, the engagement of delegations was a significant feature. Initial interest in the US proposai, and concern to ensure that it did not resolve in ways in which the dispute settlement mcchanism could be undennined, led over time to a wide appreciation of the potential benefits of the Rules of Conclu ct as a safeguard for participants in the dispute settlement system against unfounded daims of bias and, th us, as an additional buttress to the integrity of the dispute settlement system.
The process of informai working group meetings, focusing on an Article-by-Article consideration of successive drafts from the Chairman-or of Chainnan's language for potential Articles-was supplem_ented by a pro cess of putting questions to delegations in orcier to understand fully the nature of their interest and objectives in respect of specifie elements of the draft text. This proved particularly helpful in terms of advancing discussion and text on, for example, the role of the secretariat; as well as on the issues of scope and appcarance; and the standard of evidence and procedures required under Section VIII on challenges. Among the most difficult issues to resolve was that concerning the criteria for a decision to disqualify a covered pers on (Section VIII: 1, 2), especially in cases of non-disclosure, i.e. whcn a m_atter was not disclosed to the relevant authorities. The Chairman spent mal}y hours trying to find a solution to this issue.
An example of the conccrns which had to be resolved concerned the staff of the Secretariat involved in the dispute settlement process. Initially, son1e Membcrs wished to exclude the staff of the Secretariat frmn the ambit of the Rules ofConduct. However, further discussions isolated their concernas being that the Rules ofConduct shotùd not inhibit the Secretariat from_ playing its traditional role, in providing infonnal guidance to Members on dispute settletnent precedents, etc. This point has been clarified within the text of the Rules ofConduct (Section JV:2). Further concerns arose over the necd to recognize that the Director-Gcncral has responsibility for the employment and suspension of the Secretariat staff and that the appropr:iate way of dcaling with them was through Staff Regulations. Th us, the final text provides a flexible solution in this arca and also recognizes the Director-General's role (as weil as the interest of Members in transparency) in dealing with the challenges of Secretariat staff.
The issue of the Trvoe was idcntified carly in the negotiations as one which would need to be addressed, but it was set to one side by mutual agreement while the outstanding issues were successivcly resolved. The course of ncgotiations on this issue was influenccd, not unexpectedly, by developrnents clsewhere within the WTo, pertaining to the textiles scctor and, inter alia, the relationship bctwecn the Dsu and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. Discussions with key delegations and Ambassador Armstrong on this outstanding issue of the TMB members, were intensified in late 1995, but progresscd only slowly from early to mid 1996, bcfore the Chairman was able, with the co-operation of ali the key delegations, to conclude the negotiations in late 1996.
IV. THE RULES OF CONDUCT FOR THE Dsu: THE MAIN ISSUES

A. THE GENERAL FUNCTIONING OF THE RULES OF CONDUCT FOR THE DSU
In the previous section, the birth of the WTo Rules of Conduct for the Dsu was outlined. This section offcrs a general description of the content and functioning of the fmal text of the Rules of Conduct. This should facilita te an understanding of the issues raised during the negotiations and the evolution of the draft.
The WTo Rules ofConduct act in two ways: they impose certain requirements on persons participating in the dispute settlemcnt processes of the WTO which, if respected, provide protection against potential challenges. The Rules of Conduct as they stand today co ver four groups of people (Section rv) who arc dealt with in different ways: (1) panelists, experts listed in Anncx la and arbitrators listed in Annex lb; (2) Inembers of the Appellate Body (and its support staff); (3) staffmembers of the WTo Secretariat; and (4) TMB members. Throughout the text, the three first groups are called "covered persons".
The covered persons are subject to the same general obligations: to be indepcndent and impartial, to avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest and to maintain confidcntiality (Section II). Thesc obligations are already contained in the Dsu. To ens ure th at the se obligations are respected, ca ch covered person is expected to (Section Ill) (1) adhere stricrly to the provisions of the Dsu; (2) disclose the existence or development of any interest, relationship of matter that is likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her independence or in"lpartiality; (3) take duc care to avoid any direct or indirect conflicts ofintercst in respect of the subjectmatter of the proceedings; (4) consider only issues raised in, and necessary to fulfil his or her responsibilities within, the dispute settlement proceeding and not delegate this responsibility to any other person; (5) not incur any obligation or accept any benefit that could (interfere with or) give rise to justifiable doubts as to proper performance.
Members of the TMB are not "covered persons" as such (within the meaning of the Rules of Conduct), but their behaviour is referred to in the text of the Rules of Conduct. Section v of the text on Rules of Conduct is reserved for the TMB and pro vides that tnembers of the TMB shall discharge their function on an ad personmn basis, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8.1 of the Textiles and Clothing Agreement and the rules of procedure of the TMB, so asto preserve the integrity and the impartiality of the proceedings of the TMB. Staff of the TMB, including the Chairman of the TMB, are "covered persons" as any other staff members of the Secretariat.
A self disclosure obligation is imposed on covered persons when they join the dispute settletnent process, but this obligation continues un til the adoption of the panel and Appellate Body reports. Covered persons generally arc asked to disclose any information which is "likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or im_partiality". The wording of the matters to be disclosed and consequcntly that could lead to a disqualification process was the object of very long debates during the negotiations. Thcre are various methods of self-disclosure, depending on the covered person. TMB metnbers are not subject to the Rules of Conduct's disclosure obligation, but (as the footnote to Section v indicates) are covered by the working procedures of the TMB.
The Rules of Conduct also contain (in Section VIII) a comprehensive procedure to challenge and possibly disqualify a covered person where there is evidence of a material violation of the obligations contained in the Rules of Conduct which may impair the i~tegrity and Îlnpartiality of the dispute settlemcnt mechanism. Any challenge proccss must be completed within 15 working days of its initiation and a covercd person remains in function until his or her disqualification is decided. The challenge process varies with the covered person. For panelists, experts and arbitrators (Section VIII: 5-10), a complaint is lodged with the Chair of the Dss who would then consult the covered person and the parties. The Chair of the Dsn, in consultation with the Director-General and the Chair(s) of other relevant Councils, would decide whether there has bcen a material violation by the panelist (expert or arbitrator). For Appellate Body members and thcir staff (Section Vlll: 14-17) a complaint is lodged with the Appellate Body which will take the fmal decision. For Secretariat staff (Section V111: 11-13), a complaint is lodged with the Director-General who, if neccssary, will take appropriate disciplinary action in accordance with the Staff Regulations.
If the appointmcnt of a covered person is revoked or if th at person is excused or resigns, the replacement of su ch a covered pers on must be ensured and tin1etables of the panel or Appellate Body process are to be readjusted accordingly.
The final text of the Rules of Conduct and the procedures it contains are quite different from the initial US proposai and reveal important concerns ofWTO Members with regard to the very nature of the dispute settlement mechanism and the role of parties involved. The purpose of the next section of this article is to try to identify and understand these differences of vicws in orcier to understand better the sc ope of the rights and obligations contained in the sc new Rules of Conduct.
B. THE MAIN ISSUES DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF NEGOTIATION
In this section the 1nain points of contention and issues of the negotiations are discussed. At the Ürst meeting of the working group of informai consultations for the Rulcs of Conduct that took place in Novcmber 1994 (i.e. during the Preparatory Committee of the WTo), sorne 20-25 representatives of GATT delegations carne. Representatives were invited to give general comments on the US proposai. From the vety beginning, sorne countries exprcssed doubts as to the relevance and the necd such set of Rules of Ethical Conduct. Others favoured the approach but expressed doubts as to the means used to guarantee the so-called ethical conduct of th ose involved in the WTo dispute settlement process. Delegations focused quickly on the important issues and participants identified earl y a series of points of contention that can be listed as follows.
Appearance cif Bias and Appearance cif Impropriety
Many participants raised strong doubts and opposition to concepts such as "apprehension of bias and appearance of impropriety" as being too subjective. Sorne alleged that it was inconsistent and would either unrcasonably inhibit panelists (being delegates they may continue to me et with representatives of parties to disputes during the panel process) or lay them open to unfair allegations.
Independence and Impartiality
There werc also numerous comments on the definition of independence and impartiality, as the US proposai was drafted in terms of "panelists shall do ... " and "panelists shall not do ... ". Comment' were made that more emphasis should be placed on systemic issues and on the importance of the impartiality of the dispute settlement mechanis1n as a wh ole, not only that of the individuals involved.
Scope
There was debate on whether the Appellate Body members and its staff should be covered or not; on the rolc of the experts and arbitrators provided in the Dsu or covered agreements (an issue which required extensive discussion); and on the Secretariat (sec below).
Matters to be Disclosed
The extent of matters to be disclosed was also controversial, especially as the US proposai referrcd to "any interest, relationship or matter that is likely to affect that person's independencc or impartiality or that might reasonably create an appearance of impropriety or an apprehension of bias in the proceeding", a wording considered to be too subjective. Most delegations etnphasized the fact that concepts such as "impropriety" will always vary, depcnding on socicties, different legal systems and social norms. In this context, it was proposed that the ward "Ethics" or "Ethical Conduct" be dropped from the title as it suggested a rather judgemental assessment of what is (and is not) "ethical" in dispute settlem_ent, whereas the yardstick should be whether the working of the Dsu would be ad vers ely affected by the behaviour in question.
S. The Timing of Complaints
The absence of time-limits for complaints to be raised was also a nutter of disagreement as it could lead to con1plaints being raised when a losing party was dissatisfied with the results of a panel or Appellate Body report. This concern is given specifie weight in the final text.
Confidentiality
Many delegations emphasized the need to focus more on the obligation to respect the confidentiality of the proceedings.
The Challenge Process
The challenge process was considered to be inadequate, especially as the US proposai provided for an autom_atic disqualification of any covcred persan if parties agreed or unless the Director-General was of the opinion that there was no such violation of the Rules of Ethical Conclu ct. The need to ensure "due process" in terms of the quality and nature of "evidence" and the challcnged persan having the opportunity to present his or her views, and the need for irnpartial involvem_ent (beyond the parties) in decision-making on the challenge, etc. were issues hinted at, but developed in fulllatcr. Many countries worried that the challenge process would delay the new time-limits of the dispute settlement mechanism. ln this contcxt, they insisted that the new set of Rules ought to be fully consistent with the Dsu.
8.
Different Rn les for the Appellate Body
Some representatives, indu ding scveral Grulac Members were of the view that the members of the Appcllate Body should be subjcct to a different pro cess.
Coverage cif the Staff 1\Iembers of the Wro Secretariat
Some countries raised objections to having the Secretariat staff subject to exactly the same obligations as panclists. There were also concerns that to limit actions of staff members of the Secretariat would prejudice developing countries' access to the Secretariat's support.
Although the Chairman concluded the initial meeting with optimism as Members were broaclly willing to explore these issues, the conunents nude suggcsted a long and laborious negotiation ahead.
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEXT OF THE RULES OF CONDUCT
As mu ch as possible, ca ch Section of the existing text of the Rules ofConduct will now be addressed and the issues of the negotiation of each Section will be dealt with and, as far as possible, described chronologically. However, as the final draft of the WTo Rtùcs of Conclu ct is significantly different from the initial US proposai, the discussion will need to refer to different Sections as they existed from the initial US proposai. Indeed sorne sections have disappeared, such as a section on Independence and Impartiality and one on Application to Other Persons, whilc three new sections on Observance of Governing Princip les, Seo pc and the TMB were introduced. Moreover, certain issues, such as the debate on "appcarance ofbias and impropricty", affected every stage and nuny aspects of the Rules of Conduct. As much as possible, however, the issues are prcsented by subject matter un der each separa te section of the WTO Rules of Conduct.
Mtcr the initial meeting where delegations had been invited to make general cormnents on the US proposai, the Chairman decidcd to submit his own revised draft taking into account the cmnments m_ade by delegations. 1 4 Indeed, as mentioned above, the entire negotiation was donc around Chairnun's drafts following comments and suggestions on specifie issues identified by the Chairman beforc each meeting. Ambassador Armstrong first asked for comments on the first Sections, the Preamble and the General Principles.
The Title
On the Chairman's first draft the word "Ethical" (Rulcs of [Ethical] Conduct) in the title was bracketed and reference was made to the Dsu. At the second meeting (in December 1994) the title was agreed to be "Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlemcnt of Disputes", i.e. the Rules of Conduct for the Dsu . 15 1~ As discusscd above, the only drafts and proposai put fûrward wcre those of the Chairman which allowed him to keep control of this very sensitive ncgotiation. 15 Howcvcr, in everyday discussions it is varîously rcfàred to, includîng as the "Code ofEthics".
The Premnble
The new Preatnble proposed by the Chairnun at the second meeting referred to four elements:
(1) the ünportance of the dispute settlement n1echanism_ as stated in the Marrakesh Declaration; (2) the need to ens ure the intcgrity and impartiality of the proceedings in or der to achieve "a more effective and reliable" dispute scttlement mechanism; (3) the nccessity for Members to adhere to the rules of the Dsu and to avoid any issue of the Rules of Conduct to the detriment of the new dispute settlement n1echanism and its time-limits; (4) the need to strengthen the rules of the Dsu in ensuring that the integrity and impartiality of those involved in the WTO proceedings would enhance confidence in the dispute settlement mechanisn1. Delegations agreed gcnerally with the ideas and expressed the following two general comments.
First, that there should be a reference to the integrity, in1partiality and confidentiality of the dispute settletnent mechanism as such, rather than only to the obligations ofindividuals concerned to respect these principles which should be viewed rather as a consequence of this systemic consideration. It was felt that the obligations of the individuals involved in the dispute settlement process (to be and to rcinain independent and impartial) should be mentioned in the core of the text as a governing princip le.
Second, that there should be a reference to the GATT practice in orcier to maintain and prote ct the Secretariat staff who provide advice and legal information to delegations and who are often involved in related dispute settlement.
At the end ofJanuary 1995, the Chairman submitted a draft text which is today's Preamble except for an additional paragraph which reads: "Conjir111ing that the Rules of Conduct shall in no way nwdify the rights and obligations of Members un der the Dsu" (emphasis in original). This last paragraph was a response to many developing countries' concern that the rights and obligations they had gained during the Uruguay Round negotiations should in no way be reduced by the Rulcs of Conduct. One Member insisted that wh en rcferring to the Dsu, mention should be tnade to the "rules" of the Dsu (not only to the procedures) as the Dsu contains substantive obligations, such as those tnentioncd in Article 23. Later on, the Chairman suggested that this fourth paragraph should instead be inserted in the Section on General Principle (which later became Governing Principle) in order to make this obligation vis-à-vis the Dsu even clearer. The last sentence of the paragraph on Governing Principlc now reads: "These Rulcs shall in no way modify the rights and obligations of Members under the Dsu nor the rules and procedures therein."
The General Principle
One of the most difficult clements of the negotiation was the reference, in Section on General Princip le of the US proposai to "appearance of impropriety" "apprehension of bias", as a matter to be discloscd and as a cri teri on for disqualification. Many delegations, and especially some Latin American countries, were strongly opposed to what they considcred too subjective a critcrion to determine whether one's behaviour or actions were inconsistent with impartial behaviour and an iinpartial dispute settlement mechanism. These countries considered that WTo dispute settleJnent, maybe contrary to what was the case under GATT dispute settlement mechanism, was not only a matter for the parties involved in a particular dispute, but (because of the automatic adoption of panel and A pp ella te Body reports) constituted a systematic issue for ali WTO Members. This also explained the opposition to the provision in the US proposai allowing two parties to agree on the disqualification of any person covered by the Rules of Conduct. Delegations also disagreed with any form of , presumption in favour of disqualification, as it was initially envisagcd. Thcse two considerations werc present from the very first discussions on this set of Rulcs of Conduct.
The Chairman's first draft contained an alternative proposai on the General Principle in which he sought to address the difficult concept of "appearance of ünpropriety and apprehension of bias": "The governing princîple of these rules is tlut each person servîng on a panel or the Appcllate Body (hereinafter panelist) shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety and shall observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and impartiality of the dispute scttlement pro cess is preserved .
This principlc is to be observed by means of: (1) a duty to disclosc the existence of any interest, rclationship or matter that is lîkely to affect that person's independence or impartiality or tlnt might reasonably create an appearance of impropriety or an apprehension of bias; (2) care in the performance of duties to maintain independence and avoid creation of an appearance of impropriety or an apprehension of bias, and (3) adherence to the provisions of the Dsu. An appearance of impropriety or an apprehension of bias is created where a reasonable persan, with knowledge of ali the relevant circumstances that a rcasonable înquîry would disdose, would concludc that the affected person's ability to carry out his or hcr duties with intcgrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."
Many delegations objected to any reference to snch concepts of "appearance 'of bias" and "apprehension of impropriety" as being too subjective. The United States took the position that "appearancc" is a fundamental clement whcn the US government is selecting a panelist or is requested domestically to justify a panel report. A number of countries supported the United States and considered the references to a "reasonable persan" and a "reasonable inquiry" to be justified, arguing that there is always sorne subjective element in the concept of impartiality. They referred to the old saying that >t,,lnsticc must not orùy be fair but also be seen to be fair." One of these countries also that after stating the governing principle, the text should express the 'el<P''ct:ltl<Jns in orcier to ensure the observance of the principles, that is persans should ct 1 s.cic»c, etc (2) take due care, etc and (3) adhere, etc It was also proposed that the shotùd also be applicable to experts and arbitrators and the concepts of ~;>w,depetid<:nce, impartiality and conflict of interest should not be defined but should be lilfi,,:con:taJm<'d in sorne illustrative Annex.
Ali delegations insisted that the Section on the General Principle includc reference the confidentiality of proceedings. Delegations appcared to hesita te asto whether the of the General Principle should be on the impartiality of the persons involvcd or system as su ch. One Metnbcr suggested that the General Princip le should distinguish obligations oftwo different groups: (1) those who decide: panelists, arbitrators and rn:errtbers of the Appellate Body, and (2) the advisors such as experts, technical support legal advice, The section on the General Principle was eventually divided into two parts: the Governing Principle and the [Means for) Observance of the Governing Principle. It was understood that the Governing Princip le would refer to the purpose of the Rules of LCJ11<1WCC, that is to cnsure that ali those involvcd in the dispute settlement mechanistn impartial, independent, without conflict of intcrest and respcctful of the confidentiality of the proceedings. The Observance of the Governing Princip le would refer to the means to cnsure that the Governing Principle is observed. In that context, it was decided that reference should be made to "expectations": "each covered persan is expected to ... ". This drafting change took place in parallel with the decision to draw vmtnn the Observance Section elements of the delctcd Section on Independence and Impartiality.
The Old Section on Independence and Impartiality
The US proposai contained a Section on "Independence and Impartiality". There were numero us discussions on the meaning and scope of these concepts. In international arbitration, "independcnce" refers to the relationship between the parties and the arbitra tors, whereas the arbitrator's "impartiality" requires a judgrnent that relates more to the substance of the dispute. The objective nature ofindependence is usually opposed to the subjective nature of in1partiality. 16 Redfern, Hunter and Smith write:
"The concept of dcpendence is concerned exclusively with questions arising out of the rclationship bctween an arbitrator and one of the parties, whcther fmancîal or otherwisc. By contrast, the concept of "partiality" may be conccrncd with the bias of an arbitrator either in favour of one of the parties. or in relation to the issues in dispute. lmpartiality is thus a much more abstract concept than independcnce, in that it involves primarily a state of m.ind which presents special difficulties of measurement. Actual bias is something fairly easily rccognised, albcit difficult for a challcnging party to prove."1 7
This inherently subjective nature of in1partiality and the difficulties m provmg actual bias, which would be the result of a lack of independence or impartiality, would secm to be the reason why international arbitration conventions usually refer to circumstances leading a reasonable persan to think that specifie bchaviour was biascd. Dohaney writes th at:
"The term indepcndence measures the relationship between the arbitrator and the parties . . . . lt is a test for the appearance of bias, not its actual presence. Thus although it is possible for someone who is closcly rdated to a party, in a party's employ, or a close fu end of a party, to be able to judge that party's case without bias towards that party, the other party in the matter wotùd likely doubt d1e impartiality of the arbitrator under the circumstanccs."18 These two concepts are, therefore, different and it was indeed decided to maintain both. In an effort to limit the focus of disagreen1ent on such concepts and the related subjective aspect of "appearance of bias" or "apprehension of ünpropriety", the Chairman proposed that the types of behaviour referred to in the US proposai which ought to be disclosed, should be contained in a separate Annex, ·possibly in an illustra rive list of activities that should be disclosed. More general concepts would be maintained in the core of the text. Discussions among Members led to the conclusion that there were four basic aspects ofbehaviour that were going to be required by the Rules ofConduct: independence, impartiality, absence of direct or indirect conflict of interests and respect for the confidentiality of proceedings. Soon it became clear that any language used in the provision referring to what ought to be disdosed was going to be relevant for the section relating to what criteria could be used for the disqualification of a covered pers on.
There were numerous meetings on how to describe the scope of the Rtùes of Conduct in terms of what should be disclosed and which behaviour should be prohibited. In orcier to help Members, a note which examincd the language used in other international instruments dealing with the impartiality, bias and appearance of impartiality (or bias) of adjudicators of international disputes was made available.
This note revealed that therc are two types of international agreements which address the issue of ethics and impartiality (and independence) of adjudicators: arbitration conventions and codes of ethics (or codes of conduct). Son1e of these 1ules may be specifie to disputes for a particular tribunal or institution and some may be of multiple application with the consent of the parties. The language used in these international conventions addressing the issue of independence and impartiality of adjudicators ail reflect some subjective elements of impartiality and the realistic difficulties in proving an actual bias. To give a fcw examples of the wording used in other international conventions, one may refer to the following examples. National arbitration legislation was also cxamined. For instance, in England the test of impartiality in an arbitration tribunal has rccently bcen considered to be one of reasonable suspicion ofbias as opposed to a requirctnent of reallikelihood ofbias.l 9 This is consistent with the standard expressed in the old case of Rex !J. Sussex justices (Ex parte McCarthy) , that it is "of fundarnental importance that justice not only be clone, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be donc". Article 180(1)(c) of the Swiss International Arbitration Law provides for the challenge of an arbitrator "if circumstances givc rise to justifiable doubts asto his independence."ZO After exhaustive discussion in the working group, it was concluded that the inherently subjective nature of impartial (or biased) behaviour has been ~ddressed in most international conventions by making reference to circumstances leading a party to have "justifiable doubts" as to im_partiality. This wording appeared to be in line with a proposai by one Member which f.1.voured the expression "is likely to affect or gives rise to justifiable doubts".
At that point, the Chairman decided to divide the Section on the General Principle into two parts. The first part was to become the Governing Principle and the language used was to be nundatmy, i.e. "shall": "Each covered persan shall .... " There was a reference to the purpose of such governing princip le "so that . . . the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement mechanism is maintained". This explicit reference to the purpose of the Rules of Conduct, the maintenance of the impartiality of the dispute settlemcnt mechanistn, was going to become an additional prior condition necessa1y for a party to initiate a disqualification challenge process.
The other part of the old Section on the General Principle was to becmne the Observance of the Governing Principlc and was to contain the means through which the Governing Princip le of the Rules would be respected. Ali delegations agreed to use the language referring to expectations fi·om those persons covered by the Rules of Conduct so that each covered person "is cxpected to" (1) adhere strictly to the Dsu, (2) disclose any matter that would affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as to that person's indcpendence or impartiality, (3) avoid direct or indirect conftict of interest (including not incurring obligations or acccpting bencfits which could give rise to justifiable doubts IY M. Smith, Jmpartiality i!f"tlte Party-Appoiuted Arbitrator, 6 Arbitration lntcrnational4 (1990), at no. 4, p. 326. asto the proper performance ofthat person's dispute scttlement duties), and (4) maintain confidentiality. It was also decided that the Section on lndependcnce and In1partiality would disappear, but that an Illustrative list of the type of information that could be disclosed pursuant to these expectations would be developed in Annex 2.
The Scope (coverage)
The issue of who was going to be covered by the Rules of Conduct was fundarnental for the United States and others who considercd that anyone who could affect the dispute settlement process should be covcred by the Rules of Conduct, so as to ensure the irnpartiality of the dispute settlement mechanisrn as a whole. These Members wanted the Rules of Conclu ct to have the widest sc ope possible. Delegations generally agreed with this principlc of a wide sc ope of application, although many were of the view that ali covered pers ons should not be treated the same way by the Rules of Conduct. This led the Chairman to suggest, and the delegations to agree to, the introduction of a new Section on Scope, in which persans covered by the Rules of Conduct wmùd be identiflcd.
The issue of the Scopc subsumed two important boues of contention: persans involved in the Trvrn process and the staff members of the Secretariat. Early in the negotiations, one Mernber claüned that the Rules of Conduct should apply to the persans involved in the TMB process, which was part of the WTo dispute settlcment process. hnporting and exporting countries of textiles took opposed positions and this TMB issue triggered an additional ycar of negotiations. As to the application of the Rules of Conduct to staff mernbcrs of the Secretariat, rnost delegations were of the view that some rules should apply to those staff rnernbers involved in the dispute settlement pro cess but delegations disagreed as to the extent of su ch coverage and the mann er in which to deal with any necd to discipline staff rnernbers. An additional clement cornplicated the negotiation of the special rules for staff n1embers, i.e. the reservations by sorne staff of the WTo Secretariat.
(a) Panelists, arbitrators and experts
In the initial US proposai, the provisions were draftcd with reference to panclists and mernbcrs of the Appellate Body. A Section VI Application to Other Persons expanded the application of the Rulcs of Ethical Conduct to arbitrators: "vr. Application to Othcr Persons A. Thcsc Rules shall <)Iso apply to pcrsons serving as arbitrators pursuant to Articles 21.3(c) or 22.6 of the Dsu, pro vi ding information or tech ni cal advicc un der Article 13.2 of the Dsu, or providing administrative or legal support under Article 17.7 of the Dsu."
Right from the bcginning, Members had serions doubts as to whether ali persans involved in the dispute scttlement process should be treated in the same rnanner and be subject to the same obligations. Chairn1an Armstrong put the question very clearly to delegations:
"In addition to panelists and membcrs of the Appellatc Body, should the Rules of Con du ct be made applicable to arbitrators (and îfso which ones amongst those envisaged in the Dsu and other WTO agreements), experts (and which ones) and staffmembcrs of the Secretariat, and if so, in which mann er and to what extent should the obligations for thcse different persans app1y?" A list of provisions referring to arbitrators and experts was submitted to participants, ali of which are now referred to in Annex la and 1 b of 
(b) Members of the Standing Appellate Body
From the very beginning, sorne delegates raised the issue as to whether it would be acceptable to subject the members of the Appellate Body ta the saine set of rules and pro cess as panclists and staff men1bers of the Secretariat. Sorne argued that the Appellate Body should decide for itselfhow to behave and wh en to discipline one of its members. Considering the standing thar these judges would have, sorne delegations asked if it would be appropriate to subject their behaviour to so much scrutiny. Other delegations were concerned not to provide any 1neans ta jeopardize the independcnce of the Appellate Body but wished ta have these 'Judges" be subject ta sorne sirnilar princip1es of independence and impartiality, taking into account the fact thar they would not ncccssarily be working exclusively for the Appellate Body. 21 The difference, however, with panelists is that whereas parties must agree on pandists (exccpt in the circnmstances of art. 8.7 of the Dsu), parties do not have to approve experts or arbitrators who wonld be selected by a panel (such as in the Hormones case) or nominated by the Director-General (such as those arbitrators norninated by the Director-General pursuant to art. 21.4 of the Dsu in Bana11as Ill or]apan: Taxes of/ Akohofic BeiJerages). These experts and ;ubitrators couid always be challenged by a party convinced that the said person had not disdosed something that would constitute a violation of the Rules ofConduct oris behaving in a manner inconsistent with the Ru les of Condnct.
Resolution of this issue was helped by the Grulac proposai for a three-track approach which allowed n10re flcxibility in the administration of the Rules of Conduct. It was th en agreed that the mernbers of the Appellate Body would disclose to then1selves collectively. This is why it was written that the disclosure was to be tnade to the Standing Appellate Body. The decision to disqualify one of their own would aiso be taken by the n1en1bers of the Appellate Body collectiveiy and, a part from the parties, for reasons of transparency, they would infonn the DsB and pro vide relevant infornution.
A long debate concerned the consideration that the Appellate Body should give to the parties' argum_ents and allegations. The initial US proposai gave the parties the right to agree on the disqualification of any covered person indu ding members of the Appcllate Body, but this was opposcd by many participants. Th en remained the issues of wh ether the Appellate Body ought to take into account the argmnents raised by the parties in support of their allegation of conflicts of interest, wh ether the Appellate Body should have a formai hearing with the parties, whether any decision shouid be justified and, if so, to what extent. It was finally decided that: "16. It shall be for the Standing Appellate Body to take any appropriate action after having provided a reasonablc opportunity for the views of the person concerned and the parties to the dispute to be heard.
The Standing Appellate Body shall inform the parties to the dispute and the Chair of the DsH of its decision, together -with relevant supporting information." (c) Staff members of the WTo Secretariat
The issue of the staff members of the Secretariat was extremely cmnplicated. The initial US proposai envisaged the staff membcrs of the Secretariat involved in a dispute disclosing any opinion they bad given on the merits of a case. Many delegations opposed the second paragraph of Section Vl on "Application to Other Persons" of the US proposai which rcad: "A. ... They [Rulcs ofEthical Conduct] shall also apply to Secretariat officers designated to assist in a panel proceeding.
l3. The disclosure statement made under Section IV ab ove by a Secretariat officer desîgnated to assist in a panel proceeding shall indude bis or her involvement in any past disputes învolving the same or similar subject-mattcr. A Secretariat official who has provided advice to a 'Member concerning the measures at issue in a dispute may not participate in the panel proceeding."
Fron1 the beginning of the negotiations, developing and sorne developed countries were of the view that to force members of the Secretariat to disclose any information they may have provided to delegations, before such staff membcrs could be considered for participation in any dispute settlcm_cnt process, would lead staff mc-mbcrs to refuse to help countries for fear ofbeing considere cl to be in violation of the Rulcs of Conduct when rcqucsted to assist panelists in a dispute. At the sarne time, aU Members wanted the Secretariat staff to be covered by obligations of independencc and irnpartiality, although some Latin Arnerican Mcmbers considered that they wcre already subject ta these obligations through application of Article VI of the WTO Agreement and through the application of the Staff Rules and Regulations. It was proposcd, and many delegations supported that view, that it should be for the Director-General to represent the staff of the WTo vis-à-vis Mcmbers who should not be entitled to challenge individuals dircctly. Major developed countries had different views on this issue; sorne took the position that staff men1bers should be subject to nlles contained in the Staff Regulations and their disclosure should be made to the Director-General. The difficulties over this issue may have been what finally provoked the so-called Grulac proposai for a three-track approach to the Rules of Conduct: panelists (experts and arbitrators), Appellate Body members and staff, and staff membcrs of the Secretariat.
After the Chainnan introduced the Grulac proposai for a three-track approach, it was casier to envisage a separatc disclosure (and challenge process) for the Secretariat staff. After scveraltneetings on this issue, it was thereforc agrecd that:
-staff mcmbers must be covered by the general obligations of independence, impartiality, absence of conflict of interest and confidentiality; howcver this could be donc through the Staff Regulations; in the case of an allegation of violation of the Rules ofConduct, the Director-General would take appropriate measures under the Staff Regulations; -access to staff men1bers should not be ünpeded; the GATT practice should be maintained for ali Members (this is especially important for devcloping countries who often consult members of the Secretariat); -staff members should be subject to a disclosure obligation in case of conflict, especially th ose who have kept some link with their government, but they would make their disclosure to the Director-General; -Mcmbers should avoid to politicize the disclosure and disqualification process, which should remain administrative in nature; this process should not be used as a means for Mcmbers to choose who would be working on their case. The Chairman, therefore, suggcsted that staff members wotùd be subject to the same general obligations, and would be "covered persans", but they would make their disclosure to the Director-Gencral. If a Membcr wanted to challenge a staff member, the cmnplaint would be made to the Director-Gencral who would then impose disciplinai-y measures as nccessaty. There was strong opposition to thesc provisions within parts of the Secretariat itself, as can be expccted from any bureaucracy. Two issues were sensitive.
First, was the subject of disqualification. What was it that staff members should dis close and how could delegations deal with the fact that the Staff Regulations were not yet adopted? On the disclosure obligation, it was first proposed that Staff members dis close only (1) their participation in earlier formai consideration of the specifie measure at issue, (2) any formai advicc under Article 27.2 of the Dsu (technical co-operation) and (3) any involvem_ent with the dispute as an official of a Me1nber. However, one developing country insisted and won general support, that Staff rnem_bers be subject to exactly the satne obligations as ail other covered persans. It was decided, therefore, that they would be covered by the general obligation (now Section IV.l) to disclose "any infornntion that is likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality".
The second bone of contention was whether infonnal discussions with a Member's representative on an issue that cornes before a panel should be disclosed. It was decided that staff members do not pro vide formai advice but general legal information, which in any case is not provided on a persona} basis. Accordingly, information offered to delegations on a day-to-day basis would not be covered by the sc ope of paragraph IV of the Annex 2 containing the Illustrative List (i.e. considcred statement of persona! opinion) discussed hereafter. (On the other band, it is always possible for a staff m_ember to consider that such legal information would affect his or her impartiality and, as such, should be disclosed.) This part of the Secretariat's function was considered of general importance and to protect the right of ail countries to continue to have access to members of the Secretariat, a paragraph 2 was added to the Section IV on Scope:
"Iv:2. The application of thcsc Rulcs shall not in any way impe de the Secretariat's dischargc of its responsibility to continue to respond to Membcrs' rcquests for assistance and information."
It was also decided that pending the adoption of the Staff Regulations, staff men1bers would be subject to the Rulcs of Conduct and that the Staff Regulations would contain the standard provision which is now mentioned in the footnote ** to Section VI:4(c). The risk ofhaving too many people disqualified for assisting panels or other dispute processes led to the introduction of the last paragraph of that footnote which would appear to envisage the cases wherc the Director-General would assign a staff member to assist a panel in situations where a conflict of interest would not be sufficiently material to warrant a non-assignment. An important element is the reference to the consideration of the limited resources of the Secretariat which reflects discussion in the working group: "When the Director-Gcncral, in the light of his consideration, including of available Secretariat resources, decides that a potential conflict of intcrcst is not sufficiendy matcrial to warrant non-assignment of a particular member of the Secretariat to assist in a dispute, the Director-General shall inform the panel of his decision and of the relevant supporting information." The issue of the application and the applicability of the Rules ofConduct to actions and behaviour of 1Ue1nbers of the TMn was raised carly in the negotiations by one textilc-exporting delegation which suggested tlut the wording of the text should be clarifled so that persons involved in the T.MB process would also be govcrned by the Rules ofConduct. On 15 Marclr 1995, this Member submitted a proposed undertaking to be signed by all membcrs of the TMB. The issue was sensitive and funbassador Armstrong suggested that it be set aside to be dealt with later and scparately. This was acceptcd. By the end of summer 1995, there was a consensus on ail provisions of the Ilules of Conduct exccpt for the issue of the TMB. At that tin1e, as discusscd above, provisions of the Rules of Con du ct had ben introduced into the Working Procedures of the Appcllate Body. Howevcr, it was clear tlut s01ne consensus had to be reached on the TMB issue befàre the Rulcs of Conduct could be adoptcd by the DSB. This led Ambassador Annstrong to resume a series of consultations from May to Nove1nber 1996, initially with six main in1porters and exporters of textile products, which led to a solution.
71JC Self-Di:;closure Requirement (disclosure ohligation)
IVlembers always agreed that one of the means to cnsure the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement n1echanism was to rcquirc any covered pers on to disclose any information that would affect that person's impartiality and independence. Setting aside the vc1y difflcult issue of the scope of this obligation, and the decision not to refer to "appearance of bias or apprehension ofîmpropriety", as discussed previously, it was understood that disdosure would have to be clone before a covered person formally participates in a dispute settle1nent process. hnportantly, this disclosure obligation ought to be a continuing obligation during the entire dispute settlement process. The .issue of the disclosure obligation included procedural aspects (how to disclose and to whom) but also ve1y substantive aspects, such as what to disclosc, when and what the consequences for failing to do so would be.
The Chairman circulated a draft lllustrative List of the type of infornution (fairly similar to today's list in Annex 2) that should or could be disclosed. The Chairman asked wh ether such a list should be binding or s.in1ply illustrative and whether covcred pers ons should be obliged to sign the disclosure statement and, if so, what the statcment should provide for.
On the issue of the lllustrative List, delegations agree cl on the following points: -The privacy of panelists and others should be respected and this should be balanced with the need to receive ail the necessary infonnation. -The infonnation received should be kept confidential. -The list should be illustratîve and the criteria for what ought to be disdosed should be whether such infonnation would affect that person's impartiality.
Thcrefore, any infonnation not mentioned in the Illustrative List could still be the abject of disclosure if the covcred persan considered that it could affect his or her impartiality. -Conccrning professional interest, thcre should not be too n1.uch emphasis on participation in previous cases. -Smne delegations were of the view that more emphasis should be put on previous publications, as these could rcveal strongly held positions, whereas others considered that publications were simply evidence of expertise in the field. Suggestions that a different Illustrative List should be used for the staff men1.bers werc rejected in a later session. There appeared to be broad support for a list because although it was illustrative, it would first help panelists and other covered persans to identif)r possible conflicts of interests and it should thereby redu ce the possibility oflater challenges which could be dan11ging to the dispute settlcment process.
On the issue of wh ether the covered persan should sign a disclosure statemcnt and whether there should be sorne statement that he or she had read the Rules of Conduct, ali delegations agreed that panelists should sign a disclosure state1nent before getting involved in the dispute settlement process and the disclosure should contain sorne statcment that the persan had read the Rules Conduct and that he or she understood that any inforn1ation that may affect one's ünpartiality should be disclosed.
Smne delegations werc of the opinion that the disclosure obligation would be the occasion for panelists to think about potential problems but also the occasion to retnove ambiguity, as anything which had been disclosed could not be the basis for an eventual challenge.
It rcmained to be determined to whom the disclosure should be made. With the three-track approach, the solution appeared more simple: different covered persans would disclose to different authorities: " ... ali covered persons describcd in paragraph VI.l(a) and Vi.l(b) shall disclose any information that could rcasonably be expccted to be known to them at the time which, co ming within the scope of the Governing Principlc of these Rulcs, is likely to affect or give risc to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality. Thcse disclosures include the type of information dcscribed in the Illustrative List, if relevant." Therefore, it was decided that ali panelists, arbitrators and experts, prior to confirmation of their appointment, should complete the standard disclosure form. The information would be disclosed to the Chaitperson of the DSB for consideration by the parties to the dispute.
Members of the Standing Appellate Body and staff serving on the Standing Appellate Body sclected to hear the appeal of a particular case would complete the standard disclosure form. The information would be disclosed to the Standing Appellate Body for its consideration as to whether the persan concerned should be involved in a particular appeal.
When being considered to assist in a dispute, Staff members of the Secretariat would spccifically disclose to the Director-Gcneral for his consideration any information re garding the ir participation in earlier form_a1 consideration of the specifie measure at issue in a dispute under any provisions of the WTO Agreement, including through formallegal advice under Article 27.2 of the Dsu, as weil as any involvctnent with the dispute as an official of a WTo Member government or otherwise professiona1ly, beforc havingjoined the Secretariat. lt is al<>o important to note tlut the obligation is entitled "self-disclosure", that is to say it is self-dctermined as it is for each covered persan to decide whether a matter should be disclosed. Finally, it was also agreed that the disclosure should be made in any case bef ore a dispute pro cess is initiated, but that this disclosure obligation should remain throughout the process in case a change of circmnstances affected that impartiality or independence. Then surfaced again the issue of the consequences for a party of withholding information during the dispute process that could lead to the disqualification of a covered person, further discussed bclow.
Conjidcntiality
Respect of conf1dentiality was al ways an important feature of these negotiations. Although the Dsu refers in nmnerous Articles to the obligations of Men1bers to respect confidentiality and etnphasize the confidentiality of the dispute settlement process, was considcred necessary that respect of conf1dentiality be mentioned in the Preamble, the Governing Principle and in the Section on the Observance of the G<JV<errtin~r Principle. Y et Mernbers insisted that an additional separate Section on Confidentiality be maintained. It can be argued that this Section on Confidentiality clarifies existing provisions of the Dsu in providing that no covered pers on shall make any statetnents WTo proceedings or the issues in dispute in which that person is participating, until the report of the panel or the Standing Appellate Body has been derestricted.
171e Challenge Proccss (Procedures Concerning Subsequent Disclosure and Possible lvfaterial Violations)
The challenge process was in fa ct the core of the Rules of Conduct. Although one could argue that the obligation of independence, impartiality, absence of conflict interest and confldentiality already existed in the language of the Dsu and the WTO Agreem_ent, this was not the case for the disclosure obligation and even less so for right for a party to ask for the disqualification of a covered person, i.e. the so-called "challenge pro cess". As mentioned, the initial US proposai contained a very Section on Procedure for Disqualification, while the thrust of the procedure was contained in a draft decision to be adopted by the DsB. After scveral meetings, it became clear that some delegations would insist that a violation of the Rules of Conclu ct should not neccssarily lead to the disqualification of the covercd person. After many ncgotiation sessions, it was finally agreed that two conditions would be nccessary for a challenge process to be validly initiatcd. There must be a high level of proof to initiate the process-hencc "evidence" of a "tnaterial" violation of one of the obligations of the Rulcs of Conduct. In addition, and most importantly, there must be an allegation that such violation rnay impair the integrity, imparti·,ùity or confidentiality of the dispute settlemcnt mechanism. Only if these two conditions exist can a party initiate a challenge process.
(b) Criteria for the decision to disqualify a covercd persan (Section vm:1, 2)
The text of the R ules of Conduct do es not contain a specifie list of criteria to be used by the relevant authorities for dcciding whether to disqualify a covcrcd person. There is, however, the Illustrative List of information that may affect the impartiality of a persan and which, thercfore could be uscd as criteria when deciding whether a person has not been impartial or independent or whcthcr there is direct or indirect conflict of interest. Therefore, it will be for each case to be dccided on its specifie facts.
A numbcr of delegations expressed great difficulties with the idea that t.1ilure to disclosc a matter that arguably could or should have been disclosed, could in itself constitute automatically a violation of the Rules of Conduct. Many delegations insiste cl that the disclosure obligation was self-dctermined and that it would be trivial to disqualify someone just bccause he or she failed to understand that certain information could be relevant to the dispute. On the othcr hand, other Members insisted that disclosurc constitutes an obligation contained in the Governing Principle and an expectation explicitly referred to in the Section on Observance of the Governing Principle. At the end, the latter countries, including the United States and the European Cormnunities finally agreed that the L"1ilurc to disclose would not as such constitutc a violation of the Rules of Conduct, unless thcre was also evidence that the matter not discloscd constituted a "material" violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality, confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interests, and that the integrity, impartiality or conftdentiality of the dispute settlement mcchanism would be impaired thcreby. This is now stated in Section vm:2 of the Rules ofConduct.
This paragraph 2 mcans that in cases where one party alleges that a covered person has failed to disclose a fàct, i.e. a violation of the Rules of Conduct which makes disclosure mandatory, there must be three elen1ents for a person to be disqualified: (1) th cre must be evidence of the failurc to disclose, (2) thcre must be proof that the nondisclosed matter in fact constitutes a violation of one of the obligations ofindependcncc, impartiality, confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interests, and (3) there must be evidence that the integrity, impartiality or confidentiality of the dispute settlement mechanisn1 would be impaired thereby.
(c) Withho/di11g information (Section VIII:3} Anothcr subject of very long ncgotiations was the issue of when such relevant information regarding a possible violation ought to be subm.itted. The fear was that information could be misused. ln other words, could a party have evidence that a covered persan is violating the Rules of Conduct and wait for the end of the dispute scttlement pro cess to raise the issue if that party is dissatisfied with the results of the Panel or Appellate Body reports? To deal with this conccrn, delegations suggested a series of time-limits within which such evidence should be brought to the attention of the covered person and the other party. One argument was that there was no n1eans to control when exactly a party can be considered to be weil informed of a situation so as to lodge a complaint and that to force parties to complain too rapidly about dubious situations would only lead to frivolous complaints. Therefore, it was decided that compromizing evidence should be brought to the appropriate authority "at the earliest possible time". As further reassurance against possible tnisuse, an additional paragraph in the final text provides that: "Whcn such evidence is not provided at the earliest practicable time, the party submitting the evidence shall cxplain why it did not do so carlier and this explanation shall be taken into account in the procedures initiated in paragraph vur:1." (For instance, one could argue that the withholding of information by a party should be considered as evidence that the dispute settletnent mechanism has not been impaired and, therefore, that the second condition for disqualification is not met.) (d) The role of the parties in the disqualification dedsion~making process (SectÎo/1 VIII:8) In the initial US proposai, parties could agree whether to disqualify a covered person. This issue was battled over until the last minute, and indced, setting aside the negotiations on the TMB, this aspect was the last point of contention resolved. Major countries and others argued that the dispute belongs to the parties and, for instance, parties can settle a case without taking into consideration the rights ofthird parties. They furthcr argued that to refuse parties the right to disqualify a person, when they had selected that person, went against the principle and the practice of the GATTIWTO dispute settlement and would only lead to the absurd result where one of the said parties would withdraw and then re-initiate such a case and select different panelists. The response to this argument was that it was wrong to sec the new Wro dispute settlement mechanism as a matter for the parties only. Throughout the Dsu, Members were given the right to control disputes and the implementation of panel reports. It would be unreasonable to deny the systemic impact of any disqualification. The rcsponse to the alleged threat of withdrawal from a case and its subsequent re-initiation, was simply that if parties wanted to misuse the system they would bear the blame; if the I-lules of Conduct werc to authorize su ch "conspiracy" of the parties, it would be the en tire WTo system that would be to biarne! The reputation of the panelists was also at stake and the integrity of the system was not to becmne hostage to possible disqualification frivolities. It was finally decided that wh en parties agree that a nuterial violation of the Rulcs of Conduct has occurrcd, it would be expected that the disqualification of the panelist would be confirmed, but an additional condition was imposed: such disqualification ought to be consistent with nuintaining the integrity of the dispute settlement mcchanism.
To ensurc that this principle was clearly understood, appropriatc language was inscrted at the beginning of paragraph vm:8:
"In ail cases the Chair of the Dsu, in consultation with the DG and the Chairs of the ath er Councils, would decide whether a violation of the Rules had occurred. Wh cre the parties agree that a material violation bas occurred, it would be expected that, consistent with maintaining the integrity of the dispute settlement mechanism, the disqualification of the persan would be confirmed." This is to say that the Chair of the DsB, in consultation with the DG and the other Chairs of the WTo councils, always has the last say on the disqualification of panelists.
It should be notcd that for the disqualification challenge of a member of the Appellate Body or its staff, the parties' agreement is not a consideration in the disqualification process. The onJy obligation imposed on the Appellate Body in this regard is to provide the parties with a "reasonable opportunity to be heard" (Section vm:16) .
Concerning the criteria for disqualification of a staff member of the Secretariat, the Director-General maintains full discretion to take any appropriate action in accordance with the Staff Regulations.
(e) The right of the challenged persan to be heard (Secretariat! panelists! experts! arbitra tors and Appellate Body) Delegations werc most concerncd that the covered persan not be taken by surprise by any allegation of a violation of the Rules of Conduct and that principles of natural justice be respected. Otherwise, no-one would ever agree to serve as a panelist. Thus, the different procedures for the three different types of covcrcd persan provided for an obligation on the decision-making authority to ensure that the covered pcrson is weil informed of the evidence submitted against him or hcr, and that that persan is consulted on the issue before the matter is decided. Thcrefore, all relevant evidence ought to be exchanged by ali conccrned parties. 22 This would ensurc an authentic adversarial process. It was also decided after extensive discussion that only the parties could complain about any violation of the Rules ofConduct. If any other Member were in possession of such evidence, it should bring it to the attention of one of the parties. From the beginning, devcloping countries insisted on a very fast proccss. This was generally agreed and Chairman Armstrong proposed four 1neans to ensure the process is as rapid as possible. First, it was decided that the entire challenge process would have to be completed within 15 working days, that is threc weeks. Second, to ensure the efficient continuation of the panel or Appellate Body process, the persan who is the object of the challenge process would continue his or her function until his or her disqualification is decided. Third, after a covcred persan is disqualified, excused or resigns, the procedures for the appointment of a replacement would follow the Dsu procedures for his or her nomination but in half the time envisaged in the Dsu. Finally, flexibi1ity was given to the relevant bodies (panel, Appellate Body or arbîtrator) to perform any necessary modifications to their working procedures.
The TMB
As mentioned before, the issue of the TMB had been set aside with the understanding tlut nothing was agreed until the entire Rules of Conduct were agreed upon. In autumn 1995 there was consensus on ali aspects of the Rulcs of Conduct except the TMB issue. For one major textile exporter, settling the issue of the TMB was fondamental for the adoption of the Rules of Conduct by the DsB. ln autumn 1995, Ambassador Annstrong initiated a series of exhausting negotiation sessions within a smaller group of textile exporters and importers on the relationship between the rulcs of conduct and the TM13.
There wcre three main issues related to the TMB. A first and general one which ncver rcceivcd any answer was wh ether the TMB process is part of the WTo dispute settlemcnt mechanism and whether persons involvcd in the TM13 process should thercfore be covered by the Rules of Conduct as any othcr participant in the WTO dispute scttlement mechanisn1. A second issue was whethcr the actions and behaviour of the tnembers of the T11B could be referred to in the text of the Rules of Conduct and covered by some of its provisions. A final point was how to co-ordinate any such provisions relating to mem_bcrs of the TMB in the Rules of Conduct with the existing working procedures of the TM13 and with on-going negotiations in the Council for Trade in Goods to furthcr dcscribc the obligations of the TMB members to act on an ad personam basis.
This sntall group of six delegations examined whether the T11B m_embers, the Chairman and staff of the TMB should be covered by the obligations of the Rules of Conduct, and, if so, to what extent (taking into account the fact that mcmbers of the TMB arc nominated for five years and considering that the TMB process can always lead to a formai dispute settlement process under the Dsu). The delegations met numero us times in an effort to agree wh ether or not the TMB pro cess was part of or distinct from the dispute settlement pro cess of the WTo. Finally, negotiators agreed not to agree and decide to change thcir approach. They looked for a viable solution concerning the three categories of people involved in the TMB pro cess, i.e. the T11B members, the Chairman of the TMl3 and the staff of the TMB.
It was finally agreed th at the Chainnan of the T11B and the other members of the Secretariat assisting the TMB would be fully covered by the Rulcs of Con du ct, as any other staff tnembers of the Secretariat. As any other staff member, their disclosurc obligation would be made to the Director-General, they could be challenged by a party, but complaints could only be nudc to the Director-General, who would handle the matter according to the WTo Staff Regulations. The members of the TlvlB would not strictly be covcred by all the provisions of the Rules of Conduct, but expcctations of thcir conduct would be discussed in the Rules of Conduct within the parameters of a new Section v on the T11B. In that Section v the language of the rulcs of procedures of the TMB was used togethcr with an explicit reference to prescrving the integrity and impartiality of the proccedings of the TM13.
It is in that context that the concept of"covered persans" was fonnally introduced. The Chairman of the TMB and its staff would be "covcred persans" as any other staff member of the Secretariat. Members of the TMB would not be "covered persons", but would be refcrrcd to in a separate paragraph 3 under the Section: "Rules apply to the members of the TMn to the cxtent prescribed in Section v". Accordingly, a new Section v entitled "Textiles Monitoring Body" was introduced into the Rules of Conclu ct: "v. Textiles Monitoring Body 1. Members of the Trvoe shaH discharge the ir fun etions on an ad personam basis, in accordance with the requircmcnt of Article 8.1 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, as furthcr elaboratcd in the working procedures of the TMB, so as to preserve the integrity and impartiality of its proceedîngs".
The footnote '1' refers to the current TMB rules of procedure, Article 1.4: "These working procedures, as adopted by the TMB on 26 July (G/TMB/R/1), currently include, inter ali a, the following language in paragraph 1.4: 'In dischart:,>ing their functions in accordance with paragraph 1.1 above, the TMD members and alternates shaH undertakc not to solicît, accept or act upon instructions from governments, nor to be inBucnccd by any other organisations or undue extraneous factors. They shaH disclose to the Chairman any information that they may consider likely to impede thcir capacity to discharge their functions on an ad personam basis. Should serions doubts arise during the deliberations of the TMB rcgarding the ability of a TMB member to act on an ad personarn basis, they shall be communicatcd to the Chairman. The Chainnan shall deal with the particular matter as necessary
As the TMn is mas ter of its own procedures, even the introductory phrases of this footnote required careful negotiation to balance the cmnpeting interests. Accordingly, as the TMB members are cxplicitly covered by Section v only, section Il, on the Governing Principle was amcnded so dut the expression "person covcred" refers to the pcrsons listcd in paragraph 1 of Section IV on Scope, which do es not in elude the TMB mcmbers (who are mentioned in paragraph 3 of Section IV on Scopc). This is to say that TMB members are not subject to the disclosurc obligation nor to the challenge process of the Rules of Conduct, but TMB membcrs arc, through the application of the Rules of Conduct, subject to the obligations and principlcs which were negotiated in the TMI3 context with an explicit reference "so as to preserve the integrity and itnpartiality ofits procecdings". text. There remained a question as to which WTo body should adopt these Rules of Conduct.
On the one hand, it was clear that the Chainnan had received his mandate from the Dss and that, therefore, he should report to the DsB where the Rulcs of Conduct for the Dsu should be adopted by consensus (see Article 2.4, note 1 of the Dsu). It would also have been possible for the General Council to approve such Rules of Conduct, if so requested by a Member, and the decision process should still be by consensus. It was fmally decided with the legal pragmatism traditional in the GATTIWTo that the DsB would adopt the Rules of Conduct. Their proposed adoption was put on the agenda of the DsB meeting of 3 Deccmber 1996 whcn consensus was reached. The Appellate Body soon after circulated document WT /DSB/RC/2, in wbich it declared that the entire newly adopted Rules ofConduct, including Section V on the TMB, wcre now part of the Working Procedures of the Appellate Body.
From the day of their adoption, these Rules of Conduct bccame binding upon Membcrs. They become part of the contract between panelists and the WTo once panelists arc selected for a paneL Finally, the staff members of the Secretariat werc bound by the Rules of Conduct from the day of their adoption. When Staff Regulations are adopted by the General Council, the content of the footnote to Section rv:4(c) of the Rules of Conduct text will be an integral part of the Staff Regulations and, as su ch, will bind tnetnbers of the staff contractually as weil.
VI. CoNCLUSION
If the new dispute settlement rules of the WTO are a suc cess st01y, the samc can be said of the Rules of Conduct for the Dsu. The Rules of Conduct constitute by far the most detailed and sophisticated set of provisions imposing obligations of impartiality and independence on persans involved in an international dispute settlement process. Considering that the dispute scttlement nlles of the WTo are an extremcly powerful system fbr resolving trade disputes, ensuring the impartiality of th ose involvcd in any dispute settlcment process: can be seen as a necessity. Indeed, it is cssential to ensure its viability. The WTü Membcrs once again proved that the ir tradition of consensus, which may appear to slow clown certain negotiations, ensures that the content of the nües negotiatcd take into account, as far as possible, the intercsts and the needs for ali those concerned. Dming the proceedings, no covered persan shall engage în ex parte contacts concerning matters under consideration. Subject to paragraph vu:l, no covered persan shall make any statements on such procccdings or the issues in dispute in which that persan is participating, until the report of the panel or the Standing Appellate Body has be en derestricted.
VIII. Procedures Concerning Subsequent Disclosure and Possible Matcrial Violations 1. Any party to a dispute, conducted pursuant to the WTO Agreement, who posscsses or cames înto possession of evidence of a material violation of the obligations of independence, impartiality or con:fidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect confucts of interest by covered persom which may impair the integrity, impartiality or con:fidentiality of the dispute settlement mechanism, shall at the earliest possible time and on a confidential basis, submit such ** Pending adoption of the Staff Regulations, members of the Secretariat shall make disclosures to the Director-General in accordance with the following draft provision to be induded in the Staff Regulations: "When paragraph VI:4(c) of the Rules ofConduct for the Dsu is applicable, members of the Secretariat would disclose to the Director~General of the WTO the information rcquired in paragraph VI:2 of those Rules, as weil as any information regarding their participation in earlier formai consideration of the specifie measure at issue in a dispute under any provisions of the WTO Agreement, including through formallegal advice under Al_·ticle 27.2 of the Dsu, as weil as any involvement \vith the dispute as an official of a WTO Member government or otherwise professionally, before havingjoined the Secretariat.
The Director-General shall consider any such disclosures in deciding on the assignment of members of the Secretariat to assüt in a dispute.
When the Director-General, in the light of his consideration, induding of available Secretariat resources, decides that a potential conflict of interest is not sufficiently material to warrant non-assignment of a partîcular member of the Secretariat to assist in a dispute, the Director-General shall infonn the panel of his decision and of the relevant supporting information." evidence to the Chair of the DsB, the Director-General or the Standing Appellate Body, as appropriate according to the respective procedures detailed in paragraphs vm:S to vm:17 below, in a written statement specifYing the relevant facts and circumstances. Other Members who possess or come into possession of such evidence, may provide such evidence to the parties to the dispute in the interest of maintaining the integrity and impartiality of the dispute seulement mechanism. 2.
When evidence as described in paragraph VIII: 1 is based on an allegcd failure of a covered persan to disdose a relevant interest, rclationship or matter, that f:1ilure to disclose, as such, shaH not be a sufficient ground for disqualification unless thcre is also evidence of a material violation of the obligations ofindependence, impartiality, confidentiality or the avoidance of direct or indirect conflicts of interests and that the întegrity, impartiality or confidentiality of the dispute settlcment mechanism would be impaired thereby.
3.
When such evidence is not provided at the earliest practicablc time, the party subrnitting the evidence shall explain why it did not do so earlier and this explanation shaH be taken into account in the procedures initiated in paragraph VIII:l.
4.
Following the submîssion of su ch evidence to the Chair of the Dsll, the Director-General of the WTO or the Standing Appellate Body, as specified below, the procedures outlined in paragraphs Vli!:S to vm:17 below shall be completed within ftfteen working days.
Panelists, Arbitrators, Experts
5.
If the covered persan who îs the subject of the evidence is a panelist, an arbitra tor or an expert, the party shall provide su ch evidence to the Chair of the DsD.
6.
Upon receipt of the evidence refCrred to in paragraphs VIII: 1 and vm:2, the Chair of the DSB shaH forthwith provide the evidence to the persan who is the subject of such evidence, for consideration by the latter. 7.
If, after having consulted with the persan concemed, the matter is not resolved, the Chair of the DsB shall forthwith provide ali the evidence, and any additional information fiom the persan concemed, to the parties to the dispute. If the persan concemed resigns, the Chair of the Dsn shall infonn the parties to the dispute and, as the case maybe, the panelists, the arbitrator(s) or experts. 8.
In ali cases, the Chair of the DsB, in consultation wîth the Dircctor-General and a sufftcient number of Chairs of the relevant Council or Co un cils to provide an odd number, and after havîng provided a reasonable opportunity for the views of the persan concemed and the parties to the dispute to be hem·d, would decide whether a material violation of these Rulcs as referred to in paragraphs VIII:l and vm:2 abovc bas occurred. Where the parties agree that a material violation of these Rules has occurred, it would be expected that, consistent with maintairùng the integrity of the dispute settlement mcchanism, the disquali6cation of the persan conccmcd would be confirmed. 9.
The persan who is the subject of the evidence shall continue to participate in the consideration of the dispute unless it is decided that a material violation of these Rules has occurred. 10.
The Chair of the Dsn shall thereafter take the necessary steps for the appointment of the persan who is the subject of the evidence to be formally revoked, or excused from the dispute as the case may be, as of th at time.
Secretariat
11.
If the covered persan who is the subject of the evidence is a mcmber of the Secretariat, the party shall only provide the evidence to the Director-General of the WTo, who shall forthwith provide the evidence to the persan who is the subject of such evidence and shall further inform the othcr party or parties to the dispute and the panel.
12.
It shall be for the Director-General to take any appropriate action in accordance with the Staff Regulations.*** 13.
The Dircctor-General shall inform the parties to the dispute, the pand and the Chair of the DsB of his decision, together with relevant supporting information.
Standing Appellate Body
14.
If the covered person who is the subject of the evidence is a rnember of the Standing Appelbte Body or of the Standing Appellate Body support staff, the party shall provide the evidence to the othcr party to the dispute and the evidence shaH thereafter be provided to the Standing Appellate Body. 15.
Upon reccipt of the evidence referrcd to in paragraphs vm:1 ·md vm:2 above, the Standing Appellate Body shall forthwith provîdc it to the persan who is the subject of su ch evidence, for consideration by the latter. 16.
It shaH be for the Standing Appellate Body to take any appropria te action after having provided a reasonable opportunity for the views of the persan concerned and the parties to the dispute to be beard. 17.
The Standing Appellate Body shall inforrn the parties to the dispute and the Chair of the DSB of its decision, together with relevant supporting information.
* * *
18.
Following completion ofthe procedures in paragraphs vm:S to VIII: 17, if the appointrnent of a covcred person, other than a membcr of the Standing Appcllate Body, is revoked or that persan is excused or resigns, the procedures specified in the Dsu for initial appointmcnt shaH be followed for appointment of a replacement, but the time periods shall be half those specîfied in the Dsu. ****The member of the Standing Appellate Body who, under that Body's rules, would next be sdected through rotation to consider the dispute, would automatically be assigned to the appeal. The panel, membcrs of the Standing Appellate Body hearing the appeal, or the arbitrator, as the case may be, may then decide after consulting with the parties to the dispute, on any necessary modifications to their working procedures or proposed timetable.
19.
Ali covered persans and Members conccrned shall resolve matters involving possible material violations of these Rulcs as cxpeditiously as possible so as not to delay the completion of procecdings, as provided in the Dsu. 20.
Except to the extent strictly neccssary to carry out this decision, all information concerning possible or actual matcrial violations of these Rules shall be kept confidential.
IX. Revicw
1.
Thesc Rules of Conduct shall be reviewcd withîn two ycars of their adoption and a decision shaH be taken by the Dsn as to whether to continue, modif)r or tcnninate thcse Rules.
Annex 1a
Arbitra tors acting pursuant to the folluwing provisions: -Articles 21.3(c); 22.6 and 22.7; 26.1(c) and 25 of the Dsu; *** Pen ding adoption of the Staff Regulations, the Director-Gcneral would act in accordancc with the following draft provision for the Staff Regulatiom: "If paragraph vm: 11 of the Rules of Conduct for the Dsu goveming the scttlemcnt of disputes is invoked, the Director-Gencral shaH comult with the persan who is the subject of the evidence and the panel and shall, ifnecessary, take appropriare disciplinary action." **** Appropriate adjmtment> would be made in the case of appointments pursuant to the Agree-ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Mcasures.
